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Introduction: Global Governance
and Climate Change
Timothy Cadman
Purpose of this book
In this volume of edited chapters, the contributors evaluate how the
various institutional arrangements, actors and agendas that comprise
what has been referred to as the global climate regime complex impact
governance quality. Considering the fundamental features of the cli-
mate regime complex – notably interests and power – governing the
management of climate change is a very fragmented affair. It has been
further argued that this fragmentation might actually have advantages
over other formations, particularly with regard to adaptability and flexi-
bility – but only if the right conditions are in place (Keohane and Victor
2010: 25). Using an approach based on governance analysis, this book
explores these conditions to determine the institutional legitimacy of
contemporary responses to anthropogenic climate change.
Institutions and instruments in the governance of climate
change management
The role institutions play in tackling the problem of climate change and
how they help or hinder the actions taken have become increasingly
significant in recent years (Barnett 2010: 316). The establishment of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1991 set the
intellectual framework for global climate deliberations. Once the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) came
into force in 1994, IPCC’s largely technocratic approach was heavily
influenced by the neo-liberal market order, exemplified by three flexi-
bility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (KP): international emissions
trading (IET), joint implementation (JI) and the Clean Development
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Mechanism (CDM). Since 2005 there has also been a European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), linked since 2008 to the purchase
of carbon credits from JI and CDM projects. Between the Conference
of Parties (COP) 7 in Marrakesh in 2001 and COP 12 in Nairobi in
2006, the original IPCC focus on mitigating atmospheric processes and
mean global temperatures began to be supplanted by discussions around
vulnerability and adaptation issues (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007:
126–130). Although advocates for environmental justice and southern
countries had argued on this perspective for some time previously, the
eventual policy shift led to climate change no longer being simply
framed as an environmental problem, but as a societal problem with
an environmental component (Barnett 2010: 15). This has resulted in a
growing interest in strengthening the capacity of southern, developed
countries to respond to climate change. Although this has not greatly
affected developed countries’ actions regarding implementation of the
KP, it has added further uncertainty regarding the shape of the post-2012
climate policy landscape (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007: 128–129).
The problem of climate change governance is made more diffi-
cult by the ever-increasing and/or evolving numbers of new bodies,
mechanisms and proposals relating to policy development and imple-
mentation. Climate change management constitutes one of the most
significant and normatively embedded post-1992 Rio ‘Earth’ Summit
‘meta’ institutions, and the UNFCCC has its own sets of institutional
arrangements, replete with a variety of governance systems to tackle the
problem of climate change through market-based or other sustainable
development initiatives. However, multilateral environmental agree-
ments are no longer the only, or even central, mechanism for global
environmental governance and they sit alongside a range of other
forms, both public and private, functioning on many different levels
and layers of authority and including many different actors – not just
governments (Andonova et al. 2009: 52). Although it is mostly state
actors who exercise authority on the basis of their control at the national
level, climate change governance is simultaneously global and local,
state and non-state, and it is characterised by the existence of many
forms of authority through which different constellations of actors
interact to shape policy outcomes (ibid: 67; Betsill et al. 2006: 141).
Consequently, understanding governance more in terms of multi-level,
multi-spatial networks is likely to better assist in determining how
negotiations between national governments and non-state stakeholders
can more effectively contribute to sustainable development post-2012
(Bumpus and Cole 2010: 543). Governance analysis has therefore seen a
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move away from international relations as the sole lens through which
to examine the phenomenon, and comparative politics, political econ-
omy and a range of political science approaches are being applied to
interpret and shape developments (Bulkeley 2010: 311).
Interests and issues in the governance of climate change
management
The substantive output of Rio, Agenda 21, embedded non-state participa-
tion in the normative framework of international environmental policy
and the role of non-state interests in environmental decision-making at
all levels was formally acknowledged (United Nations 1992: 230–235).
The expectation for increased citizen participation in decision-making
that these developments have brought about therefore raises some
dynamic tensions between state and non-state actors in the creation of
global environmental policy. A range of participants are involved in the
governance of climate change management, from both the geo-political
and sectoral spheres, from the local through to the international, each of
which is influencing the other (Bulkeley 2010: 312). Local government,
for example, is taking initiatives in its own right and within national
and international arenas (Andonova et al. 2009: 52–53; Koehn 2010:
405). The trend is now for transnational cooperation across governmen-
tal levels, regions and within networks that include non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and corporations. Non-state actors, previously
outside the formal decision-making arenas, are now playing a role in
the formation of public policy, and their participation is challenging
traditional conceptions of power and authority (Andonova et al. 2009:
52–53). This has implications for the nature of relations between state,
society and the economy, and for previous notions of legitimacy and
accountability (Bulkeley 2010: 312). Given the cross-border nature of
the issue, its complexity and the number of players involved, climate
change policymaking has lent itself to this type of governance. The KP
in particular has opened up climate change to market mechanisms, cre-
ating governance structures that require cooperation between state and
non-state actors, even if it is the nation state that ultimately endorses
them (Andonova et al. 2009: 57–58).
Sustainable development has been identified as the bridging mech-
anism for integrating climate change and development policies. This
nexus will be highly important in the post-2012 agreement, especially
in the provision of financial and technical support (Metz and Cox
2008: 99–100). This is especially the case for the emerging ‘Post-Kyoto’
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mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion (REDD or REDD+). Following the Rio model of engagement, such
mechanisms allow for multi-stakeholder participation in the governance
of climate change management and enhance local capabilities. How-
ever, current arrangements are providing the West with a cheap way
to avoid taking action itself, while at the same time privatising the
global commons – and making nature the subject of private property
rights through the market. These realities reinforce the domination of
rich countries over poor, while alienating the poor from their land and
decision-making over common resources (Okereke 2010: 470).
There is consequently an inherent and ongoing tension between
sustainable development and the governance of climate change man-
agement. Contradictions are evident in the KP and the CDM in particu-
lar. On the sustainable development side of the equation it promotes
specialisation and North/South technology transfer and provides an
efficient way of tackling emissions reduction cost-effectively. Devel-
oping countries argue that developed countries should take the lead
in reducing emissions; developed countries in return argue that they
were unaware of the impacts of emissions previously and that it is
fairer to allocate burden sharing on the basis of current emission lev-
els (Okereke 2010: 470). The contradictions surrounding sustainable
development and North/South relations reveal underlying geo-political
tensions about global governance and climate change management. It is
usually the case that the more powerful the country, the greater influ-
ence it has on international policy positions that best suits it (Okereke
2010: 464). The current regulatory carbon-related framework and its
North to South market-based models of capital transfer and carbon
finance mechanisms have been characterised as distributing develop-
ment unevenly. It has even been claimed that the management of sinks
through the CDM represents the ‘re-territorialization’ of Northern con-
trol over the South. Whoever has the responsibility and authority over
‘sinks spaces’ – specifically plantations and the management of trees – is
especially relevant and is creating a form of global environmental gov-
ernance that is effectively imperial, an ‘empire of carbon management
and control’ (Paterson and Stripple 2007: 163).
Nevertheless, the formation of intergovernmental climate change pol-
icy has also been influenced by a reformist movement led by NGOs and
small island states, particularly in the case of Kyoto after 2001, and once
the United States withdrew from negotiations. Greater attention is now
being given to participation, accountability and transparency in the
implementation of Kyoto mechanisms, which has led to some increase
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in support for carbon markets, voluntary partnerships and ETS among
previously hostile stakeholders. This in turn has resulted in greater
alignment with the agenda for North/South equity in climate policy.
However, whether new governance practices that balance sustainable
development, market efficiency and North/South equality will emerge
remains to be seen (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007: 136–141).
Responses beyond the climate regime
As the discussions above have indicated, there is no single global climate
change regime. Rather, the principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures are spread across a wide range of initiatives operating at
the international, plurilateral, bilateral and national levels and pro-
moted by both public and private actors. While there is a tendency
to focus on intergovernmental policy responses, these constitute only
some of the elements of the broader regime complex. Important pluri-
lateral initiatives include the Asia Pacific Partnership (APP) and the
Major Emitters Forum (MEF). Bilateral efforts include collaboration by
the United Kingdom and China on technologies for coal combustion
and the United States and India on nuclear power (Keohane and Vic-
tor 2010: 3–8). In addition, there are a range of subnational, market
and civil society initiatives, including the Chicago Climate Exchange
(CCE), the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
(ICLEI) campaign Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) and standards
for voluntary offset projects, such as the World Wildlife Fund’s Gold
Standard.
Other critical policy areas are impacted by climate change, one of
the most significant being human services. In the case of health, the
well-being of millions of people will be affected by extreme weather
events, changes in the spatial distribution of infectious diseases and the
ability to maintain key services such as public health and health care,
education and health-related infrastructure (Sterling 2010: 20–21). The
World Health Organisation (WHO), the coordinating public authority
for global health, has already estimated, using available data commenc-
ing in the 1970s, that global climate change-related deaths had reached
150,000 per annum by 2000 (WHO in Patz et al. 2005: 13). During
roughly the same period, a nexus between climate change andmigration
was observed by a number of commentators, with the term environ-
mental refugee first appearing in the 1970s, a term reinforced by further
studies in 1985 and again in 1995. The studies estimated the number of
refugees to be at 25 million, but it could rise to as many as 200 million
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by 2025 (Marquina 2010a; 2010b: 192–193). Despite these predictions,
policy response to date has been labelled insufficient and the gover-
nance of migration incoherent (ibid: 203; Betts and Loescher 2010: 1).
Water availability, both in terms of quality and quantity, is a further
predicted consequence of climate change, and impacts on agriculture
and food availability for local populations are seen as being particularly
pressing. Addressing water-related legal, regulatory and institutional
arrangements is therefore essential, and some policy reform is already
underway (Mustafa 2010: 35–43). In Europe, preparing for water scarcity
is an acknowledged element of adaptation to climate change and a
component in the European Union’s latest White Paper, which is itself
a follow-up to a 2007 Green Paper, where it was acknowledged that
changes in temperature of between 2◦C and 3◦C could affect the water
resources of as many as three billion people (Monreal and Amelin 2010:
70–74).
These and other issues have made climate change a major human
security priority for the international community. But although every-
body appears to accept this is a looming problem, there is at present no
consensus on how to deal with it. This is not only partly due to issues
of complexity, as every country will have different local manifestations,
but also due to divergent agendas on climate change-related factors such
as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, deforestation and environmen-
tal degradation generally, and economic growth (Caballero-Anthony
2010: 393). Nevertheless, there is recognition that one response aris-
ing out of existing mitigation and adaptation policy approaches is that
of conflict prevention. Here the discussion regarding climate change
inevitably cycles back to governance, particularly in terms of responsi-
bility, decision-making and problem solving, all of which are identified
as critical determinants of institutional legitimacy (German Advisory
Council on Global Change 2008: 167 and 183).
Evaluating institutional governance legitimacy:
Developments in research and analysis
While the necessity of mitigating and adapting to the impacts of cli-
mate change has been debated at length, this has generally not been
the case for the institutions themselves that are charged with govern-
ing the formation of the necessary policy responses in an effective
and responsible way (Thynne 2008: 327–329). Furthermore, despite the
many dimensions of climate change being tackled at the global pol-
icy level, there continues to be no integrating approach to governance.
January 22, 2013 17:39 MAC/CCGP Page-7 9781137006110_02_int01
PROOF
Timothy Cadman 7
The problem is mademore difficult by the institutional framework at the
global level, which is often compartmentalised, whereas climate change
is a cross-sectoral issue. Concerns about institutional effectiveness have
been voiced at numerous negotiations, and there have been widespread
calls for reform of the existing governance arrangements for both cli-
mate change management and sustainable development generally. But
the development of international environmental policy still does not
take place in an arena where all ideas are welcomed and adopted. Nev-
ertheless, there has been a shift in the international climate regime
towards a greater recognition of norms and principles that stress stan-
dards of behaviour, although justice and equity remain contested terms
within the international climate regime (Okereke 2010: 463). One of
the key governance challenges is therefore how to design policies that
combine normative expectations of ‘good’ behaviour with conventional
power politics (ibid: 471).
There is a growing recognition that more research is needed to explore
the dimensions of governance quality in climate mechanisms (Corbera
and Schroeder 2011; Thompson et al., 2011). A second, equally impor-
tant, and related observation is that greater attention should be paid
to evaluating the success of climate change policies on the basis of
the social processes that drive decision-making (Barnett 2010). This is
all the more pressing in view of the fact that governance, as opposed
to government, is increasingly acknowledged as a primary means by
which social and political interaction can be understood in the global
context of state, society and the market. This perspective is predi-
cated on recognising the significance of the social–political nature of
stakeholder interactions within contemporary governance systems and
the structures and processes that underpin them (Kooiman 2000). This
grounds theory and practice within the normative assumption that
structures and processes are fundamental to understanding the quality
of contemporary governance.
Concerns about the quality of climate change governance often centre
upon gaps in legitimacy, and not just specific institutional or techni-
cal aspects, particularly among developing country stakeholders (Streck
et al. 2009). It has been argued that ‘a greater degree of self-awareness
might help us to ascertain just what it is we are doing when we use
a word like legitimacy, and help us see more clearly what changes
this betokens in the discourses of international politics’ (Mulligan
2006: 375). Legitimacy has become a core analytical problem for gov-
ernance scholars, but its study is still in its infancy (Biermann and
Gupta 2011; Biermann et al. 2009). Two theories currently dominate.
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Legitimacy can be ‘input oriented’: that is, derived from the consent
of those being asked to agree to the rules and concerning such pro-
cedural issues as the democratic arrangements underpinning a given
system. Legitimacy can also be ‘output oriented’: derived from the effi-
ciency of rules, or criteria for ‘good’ governance, and demonstrated by
substantive outcomes (Kjaer 2004). Output-oriented legitimacy can be
achieved in climate mechanisms, but a higher degree of input-oriented
legitimacy is also necessary, which may require a trade-off between
the two (Lederer 2011). It is only through significant interaction that
stakeholder interests can be aligned from the local community level to
international negotiations. The best way to enable this alignment is to
examine how stakeholder interaction is facilitated in climate processes
(Thompson et al. 2011). Legitimacy is framed quite specifically in the
approach adopted in this volume, as it is conceived as the end point
of activity within an institution. It is determined by the degree of suc-
cessful interaction between the structural and procedural components
of the institution’s governance system, that is, an integrating model, as
depicted in Figure I.1.
The institutional arrangements, underpinning the interactions
between the various participants in policy regimes, also have a bearing
on governance quality (Koenig-Archibugi 2006: 24). These arrangements
refer to commonly identified attributes such as interest representation,
decision-making and implementation. One of the major problems with
INSTITUTION
Governance
System
Structure
(Participatory)
Process
(Deliberative)
Interaction
(Collaborative)
Inputs
Outcomes
(Substantive and
behavioural)
Outputs
(Determination of 
governance 
quality)
Legitimacy
Figure I.1 Theoretical model for evaluating contemporary global governance
Source: Cadman 2011: 5
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studies that examine governance quality is that the attributes chosen
for investigation are often limited in number or quite arbitrary and
not always reflective of the whole suite of arrangements necessary for
investigating institutional performance as a whole. The current focus
(almost obsession) on accountability and transparency is a good exam-
ple. Recent work on the quality and legitimacy of global governance
addresses these criticisms through the development of a comprehen-
sive analytical approach based on two core governance arrangements:
structure and process. Here, contemporary governance is conceived
in terms of ‘participation as structure’ and ‘deliberation as process’
(Cadman 2011: 4–5). This is an extension of the existing idea that
governance is now to be understood in terms of both structure and
process (Pierre and Peters 2000: 14). In such a context, participation
and deliberation have a functional significance beyond their particu-
lar expression in a given institution; it is not the institution per se
but rather how participation and deliberation occur within it that
determines the effectiveness of its governance. In totality, the inter-
actions within a given institution represent the major components
of what can be termed governance systems, and what structures and
processes these systems utilise yield important information about the
capacity of a specific institution under investigation to combat climate
change.
The structural features of governance focus on which actors are
viewed as valid participants. In contrast, process requirements focus on
the means employed to reach decisions and implement them. Two prin-
ciples have been created to emphasise those normative values under-
pinning participation and deliberation: participation is expected to be
meaningful (that is, that involvement is genuine rather than tokenistic);
deliberation is expected to be productive (that is, that discussion and dia-
logue are fruitful and actually deliver outputs that can be acted upon).
Based on this division between structure as participation and process as
deliberation, the meaning of these two principles is elaborated by devel-
oping criteria and indicators to examine the degree to which they are
achieved in a given institutional policy context. Principles and criteria
are not usually capable of being measured directly, but they are formu-
lated to provide a determination on the degree of compliance. They are
consequently linked to indicators that are hierarchically lower, represent
quantitative or qualitative parameters, and describe conditions indica-
tive of the state of the governance system as they relate to the relevant
criterion. The intention behind the placement of these attributes within
such a framework is to ensure that they are located at the right level,
to allow for a consistent top–down analysis from principles, to criteria,
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and subsequently to indicators. Consistency in this context relates to
the correct location within the framework: it is important that elements
are placed at the appropriate level and do not overlap or duplicate those
at another and are linked back to the appropriate parameter at a higher
level (Lammerts van Bueren and Blom 1997).
Meaningful participation is demonstrated through two criteria: inter-
est representation and organisational responsibility. Interest representation
has been linked to three elements of governance that function on
the indicator level: inclusiveness, demonstrating who participates in
a governance system; equality, indicating the nature of the relation-
ship between participants; and resources, referring to the economic,
technical or institutional capacity of participants to represent their
interests within the system. Organisational responsibility comprises
two indicators: accountability and transparency. These indicators, usu-
ally treated together in the literature, refer to the extent to which
the behaviour of participating organisations can be called to account
both inside the institution and externally by the public at large,
as well as being visible or open to scrutiny by other actors within
the institution and beyond. Productive deliberation is demonstrated
through two criteria: decision-making and implementation. Three indica-
tors are linked to decision-making: democracy, referring not to a specific
mode of democracy but rather to the extent to which a system can
be deemed to be functioning democratically; agreement, referring to
the method in which decisions are reached (for example voting or
consensus); and dispute settlement, indicating the system’s capacity to
manage conflict when there is no agreement or there are challenges
to decisions made. Another three indicators are linked to implementa-
tion: behaviour change, used to determine whether the implementation
of agreements or substantive outcomes results in changed behaviour
regarding the problem that the system was created to address; prob-
lem solving, referring to the extent to which the system has solved
the problem it was created to address; and durability, capturing the
two related elements of adaptability and flexibility, as well as longevity
(Table I.1).
It should be noted that the key governance concept of legitimacy,
identified by many scholars, is not directly included, as it is under-
stood, as Figure I.1 demonstrates, as the end point of activity within
the institution. The normative concept being stressed is that the ends
and means are equally important. Both are related and consequential to
one another and both play a role in legitimacy.
In this book, ‘good’ governance is therefore not attributed to any
single institutional arrangement, such as accountability or transparency
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Table I.1 Hierarchical framework for the assessment of governance quality
Principle Criterion Indicator
‘Meaningful participation’ Interest representation Inclusiveness
Equality
Resources
Organisational responsibility Accountability
Transparency
‘Productive deliberation’ Decision-making Democracy
Agreement
Dispute
settlement
Implementation Behavioural
change
Problem solving
Durability
Source: Cadman (2011: 17)
and so forth, even though these are of course important. Rather than
evaluating the performance of an institution on the basis of a few
individual attributes, the approach adopted consequently looks at insti-
tutional governance at a systemic level. This provides important infor-
mation concerning some of the broader parameters affecting quality of
governance and their impact on policy responses to climate change.
Content and key findings
It could be argued that the approach adopted in this study is partly
constructivist in nature, particularly regarding the behaviour of actors
within institutional venues (Haas 2002: 74). This perspective shares an
interest with state-centric regime theory regarding the effectiveness of
global environmental governance, particularly as these relate to inter-
governmental organisations (Koenig-Archibugi 2006: 3–12). However,
the case studies in this volume examine a wider range of institutional
types and systems, both state and non-state, and are not confined to any
one critical approach, state-centric or otherwise.
The first four chapters focus on some of the ‘big picture’ debates
associated with climate change. Chris Taylor explores how the vari-
ous discourses within the governance of climate change management
arose, and what this has meant for various stakeholders. He finds that
once responsibility for climate change management moved from the
scientific to the government realm, it became elitist and exclusionary.
Fred Gale explores the limits of the intergovernmental approach to the
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governance of climate change management. He identifies inadequate
structures and processes for meaningful participation and productive
deliberation and argues that these deficiencies have led to the cur-
rent negotiating impasse. Non-state actors, in particular, are unable
to significantly influence outcomes. Effective change is more likely to
be achieved by refocusing pressure directly on market actors than on
attempts to control them via intergovernmental regulation. Focusing
specifically on gender as a ‘stakeholder’ in climate deliberations, Lauren
Eastwood elaborates how the ideological and rhetorical components
associated with both gender and climate change are used strategically by
non-state actors as they attempt to represent their interests in new ways
and influence policymaking processes. Adopting a state-centric perspec-
tive, Geoff Cockfield investigates the controversy around the merits of
adaptation to, or mitigation of, climate change. He predicts that liberal-
democratic states will struggle to accommodate the demands of those
who want climate change policy to be focused on mitigation. As a result,
state responses will include non-decision-making, compromised mitiga-
tion programmes, weak implementation and a lack of accountability in
pursuing outcomes and targets. Recognising these problems, he explores
the limits and possible costs of relying more on adaptation as a response
to climate change.
The next three chapters look at a number of issues surrounding
the centrepiece of climate change policy – market-based carbon off-
set management. In two related chapters Timothy Cadman and Tek
Maraseni apply the analytical governance framework outlined in this
Introduction to two key policy instruments, the emergent REDD+
programme and the now well-established CDM. After a background dis-
cussion on the emergence, architecture and institutional expression of
carbon offset mechanisms, Cadman finds that stakeholder perceptions
of the governance of UNFCCC REDD+-related negotiations vary con-
siderably among participants from the Global North and South and
across stakeholder sectors, with implications for the current design
and future directions in market-based approaches to climate change
management. Maraseni focuses on the CDM. He identifies two inter-
related problems concerning the implementation capacity of the CDM
to foster the behaviour change necessary for sustainable development
and solve the problem of enhanced GHG emissions. CDM projects
have not been able to capitalise on sustainable development objec-
tives because of the distracting incorporation of hydrofluorocarbon
projects within the Mechanism and problems associated with the so-
called ‘unilateral’ CDM policy. In addition, despite the disproportionate
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level of attention, emissions of GHGs have been growing faster in
developing countries than elsewhere. Those who have most extensively
adopted CDM projects, namely China and India, show little slowdown
in domestic emissions, and other developing countries have missed
out on CDM investment. Given the importance of investment in such
market-based environmental policy instruments, Matthew Haigh looks
at climate finance and how financial institutions, such as pension funds
and insurance companies, have interpreted and used UN-issued climate
change management policies. While policymakers have been eager to
appropriate the discourse of financial services, they are yet to supply
guidance on how policies might best be applied to wealth portfolios.
Financial institutions have been left to arrive at determinations without
the basic architecture that usually accompanies their decision-making.
The next four chapters comment on four critical policy arenas outside
the formal climate change space, but which are nevertheless affected by
climate change and climate policies. Jeff Gow explores the impacts of cli-
mate change on health systems and the governance of service provision.
He concludes that the risks to health of climate change will be incre-
mental, increasing the burden of already occurring diseases like malaria
and dengue fever and increasing the incidence of other major killers
like diarrhoea and malnutrition. He contrasts the governance of the
campaign against Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) with health responses within
the climate regime, which are fragmented, subject to special interests,
uncoordinated and in dire need of integration. Jamie Pittock looks at
water availability, which now afflicts a vast portion of the globe, and
nearly a third of the world’s people lack adequate access to water
and sanitation. It is little appreciated that many policy responses to
climate change are having perverse impacts on water resources and
freshwater ecosystems. He finds little interplay between UNFCCC and
other water-related environmental agreements and offers some pointers
for governance reform to maximise the integration of climate change
responses with sustainable water management. In the context of cli-
mate change and its impacts on food availability, Nick Rose provides
a critical analysis of the differences between the ‘food security’ and the
‘food sovereignty’ approaches to the production, distribution and allo-
cation of food resources and looks to alternative governance models
to provide a solution to neo-liberal, market-driven systems. Guilherme
Lambais and Guilherme Gonçalves challenge the legitimacy of contempo-
rary energy governance in the context of climate change. They suggest
instead a multi-level, multi-stakeholder approach based on renewable
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energy innovation and co-evolution of supply and demand, which they
believe will kick-start renewable energy markets.
The last four chapters look at the ways in which a variety of soci-
etal actors are affected by, or influence, the institutional responses to
the governance of climate change management. In two related chapters,
Richard Hil and Andrea Berringer explore climate change and conflict and
the effects on displaced persons. Hil describes the emerging relation-
ships between climate change, conflict and displacement and provides
two specific case studies: Papua New Guinea and Italy. In crafting pol-
icy responses to avoiding conflict, he stresses the need to acknowledge
socio-cultural differences and an appreciation of the capacity of these
differences to generate all manners of disruptions between and within
nations. Berringer investigates climate change-induced migration and
the ability of conventional refugee regimes to tackle this emerging prob-
lem. She provides a number of recommendations as to how to make sure
that the needs of climate-related migrants are more effectively repre-
sented within these regimes into the future. Heather Zeppel looks at the
role of local government in responding to climate change. She looks
at the ICLEI and its CCP programme. She finds that an application
of a governance analysis reveals who holds the power and influence
with such networks. While there is much positive news in local and
municipal action, the global climate agenda is dominated by developed
countries, and greater effort is needed to integrate developing coun-
tries more meaningfully. Julie Cotter discusses how the NGO sector can
exert pressure on GHG-emitting organisations by increasing the trans-
parency of climate change management, while simultaneously shaping
behavioural norms among major stakeholder groups. She looks at the
development of the Climate Disclosure Standards Board as an NGO ini-
tiative to establish a comprehensive reporting framework for climate
change information. Integration of this framework into mainstream
corporate reporting represents a potentially significant improvement
in institutional governance while also cementing the role of non-state
interests in climate change management.
In the Conclusion, the contributors to this volume summarise their
observations on the regimes investigated and provide a series of recom-
mendations with a view to increasing the institutional legitimacy of the
governance of the climate regime complex.
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